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ISLAND GOVERNANCE AND DISASTERS 
This chapter covers one particular aspect of the foreign relations of non-sovereign 
island jurisdictions (SNIJs), namely relations arising from disaster-related activities. 
Islands are among the territories most seriously affected by calamities, including the 
spectre of rising seas that may come with climate change. Yet non-sovereign islands 
are not so well equipped to speak and act effectively for themselves in the face of such 
threats. This may be true even within the governing structures in which these islands 
find themselves, but it is even more serious given the weaknesses that may exist in 
their capacity to speak to and act in the international community on disaster-related 
activities. This chapter explores this issue of 'disaster para-diplomacy' for non-
sovereign island jurisdictions, drawing on the para-diplomacy work of Duchacek 
et at. (1988), Michelmann and Soldatos (1990), Soldatos (1993) and Lecours (2002), 
and adapting it to address the special circumstances of island disaster para-diplomacy 
where a SNIJ could interact with foreign governments and with international 
agencies. 
For SNlJs, determining responsibility for pre-disaster actions, such as planning and 
mitigation, and post-disaster actions, such as response and recovery, is not always 
straightforward, even if legal responsibilities are clearly delineated. Where a SNIJ and 
its governing state's capital are far apart - geographically as well as in terms of 
communication, culture and/or cooperation - an event could affect the SNIJ without 
the national authorities realizing, or being willing to accept, the extent of the impact. 
Similarly, internationally or nationally mandated programmes related to disaster risk 
reduction (e.g. UNISDR, 2005, including national platforms for disaster-risk 
reduction) might be implemented inappropriately from the SNlJs' perspective because 
less attention is given to the SNlJs' needs compared with (typically much larger) 
national needs, as determined by and from the capital. Where perceived or real 
inadequacies arise in a state's disaster-related activities, a SNIJ has five principal 
options, some of them interconnected: 
• Do nothing. 
• Pursue full sovereignty or more autonomy from the state. 
• Focus on improving the state's actions. 
• Focus on improving the SNIJ's capabilities. 
• Focus on dealing directly with international organizations and other governments. 
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That a SNIJ has any options at all is a function of its jurisdictional power. However, 
its power is granted in the context of an overarching political architecture that will 
typically circumscribe how and when it may use these political resources. This is 
particularly the case in the 'grey area' of para-diplomacy, where neither legal rules 
nor practice will tell us enough about what a sub-national island can do in repre-
senting itself to the outside world. 
This chapter examines in some detail the fifth and last option in the above list: a 
sub-national island territory flexing its jurisdictional muscle in a direction that 
could be seen as threatening to or destabilizing of the balance of power with its 
governing state by engaging in inter-state relations which have typically been, and 
are often vigorously defended as, the exclusive preserve of sovereign states. The 
SNIJ does so in the context of disaster-related activities that may find the same 
governing state disposed to tolerate some flexibility and concede departures 
from the official rule book. But would these departures create precedents for 
other forays into international relations by the SNIJ, or other thus emboldened 
SNIJs? 
This chapter's exploratory proposition is that there is some, but little current, 
evidence for island disaster para-diplomacy; yet scope exists for it to become more 
significant, so the matter should be addressed at the policy level. An overview of case 
studies is provided as illustrative of the legalities and realities which are evident when 
seeking island disaster para-diplomacy 'on the ground'. Case studies presented are 
from the Commonwealth because that geographic scope is The Round Table's main 
interest. The lessons are then discussed, leading to advice regarding the relevance of 
island disaster para-diplomacy to the Commonwealth. Thus the chapter does not 
consider SNIJs such as Hawai'i, Hainan, Sakhalin, Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica, Crete, 
and the French and Dutch territories; nor does it cover para-diplomacy in other areas 
such as trade negotiations, offshore finance, sport (e.g. the Island Games) and 
tourism. 
Disaster diplomacy and disaster para-diplomacy 
Kelman and Koukis (2000, p. 214) ask: "Do natural disasters induce international 
cooperation amongst countries that have traditionally been 'enemies'?" Although 
the answer to this question has thus far been mainly negative (e.g. earthquakes 
in Greece and Turkey in 1999 (see Ker-Lindsay, 2000) or monitoring hurricanes 
which could hit both Cuba and the USA (Glantz, 2000)), these and other case 
studies, along with theoretical analyses on disaster diplomacy (see http:// 
www.disasterdiplomacy.org), suggest that disaster-related activities can catalyse 
but rarely create international cooperation amongst hostile partners (e.g. Kel-
man, 2003; 2005b; 2006a; Holloway, 2000; Rajagopalan, 2005; Waarner, 
2005). 
If disaster-related activities could positively improve relations among states which 
would not normally be prone to such cooperation, then a similar change could occur in 
the relations that SNIJs may have, or may not have had previously, with state 
governments which are not their governing state, or with international agencies. 
Disaster-related activities could then prove to be the catalyst to launch a SNIJ into 
international relations. 
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ISLAND DISASTER PARA-DIPLOMACY EXAMINED 
Legalities 
Three legal regimes are examined regarding island disaster para-diplomacy: 
constitutions, disaster-related SNIJ legislation, and intergovernmental organizations. 
Illustrative examples from different regions of the world are provided as an overview. 
Constitutions 
A review of constitutions of Commonwealth states with SNlJs reveals limited 
mention of disaster-related activities (see Appendix 6.1). Where emergency powers 
are detailed, they tend to rest with either the head of state or the head of government 
or are split between the two roles, sometimes with provision to delegate authority in 
case the designated individuals are unable to assume these duties. 
Four constitutions suggest connections between sub-national jurisdictions and 
disaster-related activities. South Africa's constitution's Schedule 4 states that 
'disaster management' is a joint national- provincial responsibility, but no South 
African provinces are SNIJs. Clause 187E(4) of Papua New Guinea's constitution 
gives the National Executive Council the authority to suspend a provincial 
government or a local authority which cannot govern as the result of a disaster: in 
some ways pre-empting sub-national para-diplomacy because it gives the SNIJ 
less authority. Chapter XII, 114(2)(b) of the Solomon Islands' constitution 
states that parliament shall "consider the role of traditional chiefs in the 
provinces", which leaves a possibility for chief-based, disaster-related SNIJ roles. 
Chapter II, Section 19 of the St Kitts and Nevis constitution describes Nevis' 
responsibilities and powers regarding declarations of emergency. Nevis can declare 
or revoke states of emergency, but no mention is made of requesting international 
assistance. 
The lack of mention in constitutions of SNIJs' disaster-related activities is not 
surprising, not only because constitutions are deemed to be documents covering an 
entire state, but also because an emergency is not normally a substantive area of 
jurisdiction for purposes of a constitutional division of powers. In practice, it 
would (at best) be a shared field in a federal arrangement, with the national 
government having the ever-present right to declare a national emergency (even if 
confined to only a part of the state), since it would presumably by then have 
become a matter of national interest and concern. Emergencies referred to here are 
national emergencies, even if and when affecting only part of the state. No state 
constitution expressly forbids a sub-national jurisdiction from undertaking disaster 
para-diplomacy. But, depending on the exact situation and judicial precedents, it 
would be possible to challenge before the courts any such action as violating the 
national government's responsibilities for national security, defence, foreign affairs 
or external borrowing (for example, regarding reconstruction loans). 
In the case of the UK's island overseas territories the constitutions of Anguilla, 
Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) 
mention emergency procedures, but no other disaster-related activities. External 
affairs, however, is a power specifically reserved for each territory'S governor (or 
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equivalent), who is the British government's representative for each SNIJ (see also 
House of Commons, 2004). The constitutions therefore effectively preclude para-
diplomacy from a legal perspective because any external affairs activities must be 
conducted with or through the governor (or equivalent), i.e. the British government. 
Nevertheless, as seen below, the matter is not that simple, since SNIJ action cannot be 
altogether excluded. 
Legislation 
Moving beyond constitutions to disaster-related SNIJ legislation in the Common-
wealth, there is hardly any provision to call for international assistance. For example, 
paragraphs 12d, 21h and 22j of Tasmania's Emergency Services Act 1976 permit help 
to be requested from the Australian government or from another Australian state or 
territory, but other sources are not mentioned. 
Both Canada's island, or mainly island, provinces - Newfoundland and 
Labrador (Emergency Measures Act 1990, amended 2004) and Prince Edward 
Island (Emergency Measures Act 1998) - have disaster-related legislation. Both 
SNIJs have signed the International Emergency Management Assistance Memor-
andum of Understanding (MOU) (18 July 2000) along with New England's states, 
Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The MOU permits emergency-related 
training and assistance to be provided across the US - Canada border without 
directly involving the national governments. This is because the Canadian 
constitution, as interpreted by the courts, has left open a role for provinces in 
external relations, provided they act within their areas of jurisdiction. Disaster-
related, cross-border collaboration is relatively common at the sub-national level 
(e.g. Local Authorities Confronting Disasters and Emergencies, at www.ulai.org.il! 
lacde.htm) but has not yet translated into legislation explicitly addressing para-
diplomacy. 
Inter- or supra-governmental organizations 
In dealing with inter- or supra-governmental organizations, other examples of island 
disaster para-diplomacy are evident. 
The Delegation of the European Commission in Barbados and the Eastern 
Caribbean (www.delbrb.cec.eu.int) is accredited to three UK overseas territories 
(UKOTs) - Anguilla, British Virgin Islands (BVI) and Montserrat - and deals with 
those SNIJ governments directly on some disaster-related activities. Montserrat has 
received millions of euros for reconstruction following the start of volcanic 
eruptions there in 1995, one example being €2 543000 for a 'Montserrat 
Resettlement Project' in 2005 (Selected Projects, 2005). Anguilla received 'some 
funds' to repair road damage after Hurricane Lenny hit the island in 1999 
(European Development Fund, 2006). Additionally, after Hurricane Ivan in 2004, 
the Cayman Islands were promised relief money from the European Commission in 
Brussels (Cayman Islands Government Information Service, 2006). The respective 
governors of these islands are involved in these projects to some extent; but their 
specific role in each case is not always clear, suggesting that island disaster para-
diplomacy is happening to some degree between the European Commission and the 
UKOTs. 
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In the Pacific the Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific (www. 
delfji.cec.eu.int) deals with three Commonwealth SNlJs: Cook Islands, Niue and 
Pitcairn. On disaster-related activities, after Cyclone Heta hit Niue in 2004, €600 000 
of previously committed funds was redirected to reconstruct the island's single 
hospital (Niue, 2006). 
Again in the Caribbean, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency 
(CDERA) is involved in disaster-related activities with its members through their 
national disaster management organizations. For example, the national organization 
of St Kitts and Nevis is the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). 
Despite lack of specific reference in the state's constitution, the Nevis Disaster 
Management Office (NDMO) exists. NEMA is mandated to control all international 
disaster matters and acts on behalf of both islands within CDERA. One of CDERA's 
roles is to provide an immediate and coordinated response to a disaster event once the 
affected state requests such support. In a disaster affecting a SNIJ only, such as 
Barbuda or Tobago, a request for CD ERA assistance would have to be lodged 
through the SNIJ's governing state. 
Four UK SNlJs are CD ERA members: Anguilla, BVI, Montserrat and TCI. CDERA 
works through the national disaster management organizations, yielding examples of 
SNIJs dealing directly with a regional organization for disaster-related activities, 
although again with their respective governors' involvement to different degrees. 
In the Pacific, two New Zealand SNlJs, Cook Islands and Niue, are members of the 
South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC). Its Community Risk 
Program has the goal "to improve disaster risk management practices to build safer 
and more resilient communities" (www.sopac.orgitikiitiki-index.php?page=Goal). 
As with CD ERA, this interaction with SOPAC provides examples of Commonwealth 
SNIJs dealing with a regional organization for disaster-related activities. 
Montserrat, the Cook Islands and Niue were each represented by delegations 
separate from each SNIJ's governing state's delegation at the UN World Conference 
on Disaster Reduction in Japan from 18 to 22 January 2005, run by the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). As a follow-up to 
the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, as of March 2006, BVI and the 
Cayman Islands were the only sub-national jurisdictions to have provided UNISDR 
with a National Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 
(see www.unisdr.orglenglhfa/hf-implemt-states.htm).l Also, as of March 2006, 
Montserrat and BVI are the only sub-national jurisdictions listed by UNISDR as 
providing country-related disaster information (www.unisdr.orglenglcountry-informl 
introduction.html). Island disaster para-diplomacy is occurring through the UN 
system. 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is another intergovernmental organi-
zation with SNIJ members: the Cook Islands and Niue. AOSIS "functions primarily 
as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for small island developing states (SIDS) 
within the United Nations system" on global climate change issues (www.sidsnet.orgl 
aosis). As these creeping environmental changes (e.g. Glantz, 1999; 2003) begin to 
affect SNIJs more, and perhaps to a greater extent than the SNIJs' governing states, 
SNIJs could take to the international stage to try to address these issues, thereby 
effecting disaster para-diplomacy. Sea-level rise and salinification of water resources 
are strong candidates for precipitating such efforts because they have the potential to 
threaten a SNIJ's very existence. 
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Examining these three different sets of legal regimes provides scattered evidence 
of island disaster para-diplomacy in the Commonwealth. Despite the relatively 
weak legal basis for SNIJs to engage in disaster para-diplomacy in the 
Commonwealth, there are various examples of sanctioned initiatives. They 
include having disaster-related agencies at SNIJ level partaking in regional or 
international disaster-related forums; disaster management coordination among sub-
state actors of different states; and receiving international funds to mitigate disaster 
effects. 
Realities 
The absence of legal sanction, however, may not constitute so strong a barrier against 
action. In fact, SNIJs frequently provide examples where de jure principles are 
tweaked by de facto practices. The presence of some degree of sanctioned local 
autonomy, coupled with physical distance from the governing state, provides a 
vehicle for challenging, deliberately or inadvertently, the current regime of 
mainland-island relations. In addition to legal principles, the realities of a SNIJ's 
situation could influence whether or not disaster para-diplomacy occurs. 
Tristan da Cunha, home to some 300 people, is the remotest inhabited 
island in the world and is a dependency of the UK overseas territory of St Helena. 
On 21 May 2001, hurricane-force winds caused extensive damage to Tristan's 
sole settlement. Despite damage worth at least several hundred thousand pounds 
(Brock, 2005; Brock and Glass, 2005; Glass, 2003), the UK government 
only donated £75000 (Banking News, 2001). Meanwhile, an international appeal 
was sent out through expatriate Tristanians who, within a few months, raised 
£79936.08 for a Disaster Fund (personal communication from Colin Topping, 27 
November 2001, quoting a letter he received from Tristan da Cunha's Chief 
Islander). The remainder was covered by subsequent international donations as well 
by the Tristanians, including their volunteer labour for the repairs. The majority of 
materials were ordered and shipped from Cape Town, South Africa. 
A situation existed where, according to the Tristanians, the UK government 
was not providing Tristan da Cunha with all the needed post-disaster support. 
Tristanians solicited funds from elsewhere, setting up a disaster fund for this purpose. 
They could also have approached non-UK state governments or international agencies 
for post-disaster supplies and for implementing mitigation. Tristanians, though, are 
highly loyal to the UK. One of the authors (Conrich) visited Tristan da Cunha in 
January 2002 and found a resigned acceptance of the limitations of the UK 
government's reconstruction and development assistance, with no impetus towards 
considering looking elsewhere. Another important factor contributing to this 
acceptance was the islanders' wish not to be considered beggars, and their own 
strong sense of self-reliance. To use para-diplomacy to find other sources of support 
also entailed opposing the UK government's representative on the island, an idea 
foreign to Tristanian culture. Yet the disaster fund allowed international donors (state 
and non-state) the opportunity to support the rehabilitation effort on Tristan directly, 
hence bypassing the UK government. 
Hurricane Ivan struck the Cayman Islands in September 2004. Timothy Adam, the 
Chief Executive of Cable and Wireless (Cayman Islands), suggested that one of the 
islands, Grand Cayman, needed outside help: "Grand Cayman urgently needs 
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military intervention to restore and to preserve law and order" (Adam, 2004a). Adam 
requested US military intervention because "the police are very limited in number and 
they are exhausted yet reports are that the British have refused to send in Royal 
Marines or Military Police to help". Nine days later Adam (2004b) noted that his 
original letter was not intended for publication and represented himself, not his 
company. However, he added: 
the local officials in the Cayman Islands are doing an outstanding job, considering 
the extent of the storm damage and the resources they have ... they're not sitting 
there helpless waiting for outside assistance, but frankly I believe they are less 
inclined to ask for help or expect any rapid assistance especially from Britain 
given their experiences over the past week. 
American help did not arrive; but this example illustrates a SNIJ-based suggestion of 
external governmental assistance when the governing state did not fulfil requests for 
help. 
Following the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunamis, the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands, a SNI] of India, suffered 1395 people killed, 1514 people injured, 
and 40542 people displaced (Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2005). India's 
government waived paperwork restrictions on tsunami-related foreign contri-
butions for affected regions in India, including the Andaman and Nicobar islands 
(Government of India, 2004). Normally, any organization receiving foreign funds 
must register with India's government or obtain prior permission to accept funds. 
Tsunami-related donations were exempted. This decision acknowledged that, for 
efficient disaster response, money could go directly to the SNIJ's government. The 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands Administration has the capability to manage aspects of 
crises, which includes dealing with state governments other than its governing state 
and with international agencies to gain post-disaster aid. 
The Caribbean Association of Electric Utilities and Energy Service Providers 
(CARILEC) has created a disaster fund into which members contribute. After an 
affected member utility requests assistance in restoring a damaged electricity grid, the 
fund pays for emergency teams from other member utilities to assist. One CARILEC 
member is BVI Electricity Corporation, whose sole shareholder is BVI's government. 
When this company requests post-disaster assistance from CARILEC, a form of para-
diplomacy is occurring, involving a regional agency and a SNIJ government 
represented through a public utility. 
The small islands of Tikopia and Anuta are located in the far eastern Solomon 
Islands. Officially part of Temotu province, the islands lack airstrips, jetties and 
reliable off-island communication. Governance is undertaken by the island chiefs 
who, as noted earlier for the Solomon Islands, have constitutional recognition. On 28 
December 2002 the islands were hit by Category 5 Cyclone Zoe (Anderson-Berry 
et aI., 2003; Kelman, 2005a; Vettori and Stuart, 2004; Yates and Anderson-Berry, 
2004). None of the inhabitants perished, but the devastation made their food, water 
and shelter situation dire. 
The first formal aid supplies arrived by ship from Honiara, the Solomon Islands' 
capital, despite the distance of more than 1000 km plus logistical and political delays. 
However, the closest location to Tikopia and Anuta from which relief supplies could 
have been brought is in Vanuatu, with Luganville being just 400 km away from 
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Tikopia. This possibility was demonstrated by journalist Geoff Mackley, who flew 
relief supplies to Tikopia from Vanuatu by helicopter (The Australian, 2003). 
In principle, thanks to the constitutional clause quoted earlier, the chiefs might 
have been able to request assistance by boat or helicopter from Vanuatu, albeit as a 
short-term measure. In practice, Tikopia and Anuta had only one radio each and 
both had been broken before Cyclone Zoe, being made operational only after a 
post-cyclone aid team had arrived (Anderson-Berry et al., 2003). In addition, such 
action could have had diplomatic implications. First, Honiara could have lost face 
because Vanuatu would have helped Solomon Islanders (instead of, or before, the 
Solomon Islands government). Second, aid supplies crossing state lines normally 
have to be approved by the recipient state, so if that protocol were followed, 
Honiara would have had to actively accept help from Vanuatu. Third, with the 
residents of Tikopia and Anuta being ethnically more closely related to the people 
of Vanuatu than to those in the western part of the Solomon Islands, the Honiara 
government might have interpreted Vanuatu's assistance as fuelling conflict within 
the Solomon Islands. 
Nevertheless, islanders in a post-disaster situation would presumably be more 
interested in obtaining relief supplies and rebuilding their communities as soon as 
possible wherever the help arrived from, rather than being intent on playing para-
diplomacy games. This is important because the opportunities presented for para-
diplomacy by disaster-related activities are at the same time circumscribed by 
pragmatism. A governing state may tolerate, absolve, or sanction para-diplomatic 
initiatives by any of its SNIJs in the interests of expediency, such as faster provision of 
supplies or facilitated evacuation. The SNIJ may do likewise for similar purposes, 
rather than as a strategic choice. Disasters are often short-sightedly seen as rare 'one-
off' events, even though successful disaster risk reduction is a long-term endeavour 
and needs to be integrated into development and sustainability processes (Lewis, 
1999; Mileti et al., 1999; Wisner et al., 2004). Where the short-term view prevails for 
a disaster event, expectations could be made regarding the relationship between the 
SNIJ and its governing state, even though such temporary approaches could harm 
disaster para-diplomacy in the long term, as shown for disaster diplomacy cases 
(Kelman, 2003; 2006a; Ker-Lindsay, 2000). 
DISCUSSION 
The evidence and cases drawn from Commonwealth SNIJs suggest that island disaster 
para-diplomacy has so far occurred infrequently in practice. In law no official 
documents or mechanisms were found which provided explicit permission for 
Commonwealth SNIJs to engage in para-diplomacy for specific, disaster-related 
activities, even though disaster risk reduction is best achieved at the local level with 
community involvement (e.g. Lewis, 1999; Twigg, 1999; Wisner et aI., 2004). Where 
the power to request external assistance for disaster-related activities, usually emer-
gencies, is prescribed by law, such 'external assistance' normally refers to a higher 
jurisdiction within the governing state, such as a provincial or national government. 
The power to call for disaster-related international assistance generally rests with the 
governing state. Examples of SNIJs bypassing that legal authority were rarely evident, 
although opportunities were not lacking. 
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Where a SNI] is geographically distant from its governing state - making disaster-
related logistics from this source more difficult, more expensive and slower to 
obtain - is para-diplomacy more likely? After all, if a governing state does not 
provide sufficient disaster-related support, and sufficiently quickly, for a SNIJ, as in 
the cases of Tristan da Cunha (see above) and Montserrat (Clay, 1999; Davison, 
2003; Mitchell, 2006; Pattullo, 2000), then the SNIJ might be forced to look 
elsewhere, even if logistic difficulties increase and even if the governing state 
considers such action to be illegal (which would need to be tested in court). In such 
a situation, an option to avoid bypassing the governing state would be using the 
media to embarrass the governing state into acting more appropriately. Rather than 
para-diplomacy, the media option was exercised for Tristan da Cunha following the 
1961 volcanic eruption there which led to the island's evacuation (de Boer and 
Sanders, 2002). 
Even where para-diplomacy might alleviate the situation, as in cases requiring 
evacuation where the nearest population centre to a SNIJ does not belong to its 
governing state, para-diplomacy is not necessarily enacted. Additionally, island para-
diplomacy occurs for many non-disaster activities - including sport, culture, trade, 
and tourism (Baldacchino, 2004; 2006) - irrespective of any logistical constraints 
and, at times, legalities. Indeed, SNIJ para-diplomacy is far more present for non-
disaster-related acts than for disaster-related ones. 
Two other reasons might explain why Commonwealth SNIJs have not yet much 
exploited disaster para-diplomacy. First, many SNIJs have a limited interest in seeking 
sovereignty, as long as they continue to enjoy domestic law-making authority that 
cannot be challenged by the central government (Baldacchino, 2004; 2006). One 
advantage is the 'umbilical cord' to a larger entity, the governing state, which would 
then be officially responsible for the SNI] during crises (Baldacchino, 2004; McElroy 
and Mahoney, 2000). Although this responsibility might not always be acted upon, or 
might not be acted upon with the required speed or to the required extent (as shown 
by some of the examples in this chapter), the connection to the governing state 
provides a psychological crutch which, in times of need, is hopefully transformed into 
a physical crutch, especially through disaster response and reconstruction resources. 
The crutch could fuel the view that external assistance is always at hand, hence local 
preparation is unnecessary: a 'handout mentality' identified for many islands 
(Tuiloma-Palesoo, 2004). Actively pursuing disaster para-diplomacy could push 
SNIJs towards greater autonomy, threatening the availability and disposition of the 
governing state to provide disaster-related support. However, to succeed, such 
initiatives would need to be entertained as part of long-term relationship building 
(that is, para-diplomacy proper), which should not be tied down to one specific 
disastrous event. 
Second, similarly to many sovereign governments, SNIJs and their governing states 
do not always pay sufficient attention to disaster-related activities until the issue is 
forced upon them, often by a dramatic event. The volcanic threat to Montserrat 
was documented scientifically, and the information was communicated to both 
Montserratian and British authorities (e.g. Wadge and Isaacs, 1987; 1988) but little 
action was taken until the volcano erupted (Mitchell, 2006). As Kelman (2006b) 
describes, the threat of Indian Ocean tsunamis was well documented and efforts had 
been made for at least 30 years to garner support for warning systems, but other 
activities were deemed to be a higher priority until over 250 000 people were killed by 
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tsunamis on 26 December 2004. An Indian Ocean tsunami warning system has since 
been started. Disaster para-diplomacy is not pursued by SNIJs partly because disaster-
related activities are not a high priority for the SNIJ or for its governing state. 
Overall, these reasons suggest that Keating's (1999) para-diplomacy motivators -
economic, cultural and political - exclude disaster-related activities; however, a 
disaster event could nonetheless harbour political capital. A SNIJ's government or 
political grouping could exploit a disaster situation to promote its views 
about sovereignty. Successful disaster para-diplomacy, such as using external 
assistance for effective mitigation or reconstruction, could provide evidence of SNIJ 
government efficacy and thus garner support for sovereignty among the locals. 
In contrast, continued reliance on external assistance, particularly from or managed 
by the SNIJ's governing state, could illustrate the need and logic for persisting 
dependency, garnering support for those islanders who oppose outright sovereignty. 
The poor response following the 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan contributed towards a 
subsequent revolt that led to the creation of Bangladesh (Lewis, 1999). However, the 
initially inadequate response from the UK government to the volcanic eruptions on 
Montserrat did not promote a push for sovereignty there (Fergus, 2002). 
In linking autonomy concerns with disaster para-diplomacy, balance of interests 
is a factor deserving of analysis. This compares the disaster-related interests of the 
SNIJ with those of its governing state. Balance of interests does not indicate 
directly whether increased autonomy would be promoted or inhibited by a SNIJ's 
disaster-related activities. It provides a baseline for dialogue on disaster-related 
activities between a SNIJ and its governing state by indicating each party's starting 
point for this topic. Acceptance of similarities and differences can assist in building 
trust and in tackling disaster-related issues properly, possibly influencing a SNIJ's 
direction towards or away from increased autonomy. Yet the autonomy-related 
decisions of a SNIJ or its governing state are not necessarily based on practicalities 
such as balance of interests, needs, or the population's desires. Nationalism or a 
governing state's wish to get rid of a 'liability' could be a key driver nudging a 
SNIJ towards sovereignty - what has been called "upside down decolonization" 
(Hoefte and Oostindie, 1989) - and a specific response (or non-response) regarding 
disaster-related activities may be part of a governing state's and/or a SNIJ's wider 
plan regarding the SNIJ's future. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter supports the conclusion drawn by Kelman and Koukis (2000) that a 
disaster could significantly spur a diplomatic process which had another basis, but 
that a disaster per se is unlikely to generate new diplomacy. Disaster-related activities 
can catalyse, but do not create, or sustain cooperation. 
There are, however, 'windows of need' which present opportunities for pragmatism 
in the context of disasters. Para-diplomacy has been an option in such situations; but 
rarely has this option been adopted and such powers usurped. Moreover, a disaster 
event might not be the best situation to entertain para-diplomacy, since the latter is 
essentially a sustained, cultivated and groomed long-term relationship with significant 
state and non-state actors, as disaster-related activities ought to be. Regrettably this is 
not always so with decisions made during and immediately following disaster events. 
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Given the impact of disasters on SNlJs and the strong link of disaster-related 
activities to development, sustainable livelihoods and environmental management 
(e.g. Lewis, 1999; Mileti et al., 1999; Wisner et al., 2004), there is no obvious reason 
for disaster-related activities to be outside the purview of para-diplomacy. Moreover, 
a disaster could present an opportunity to the politically resourceful. Both pro- and 
anti-sovereignty movements in a SNIJ could use disaster para-diplomacy or the lack 
thereof to support broader political goals, irrespective of legal coda. 
Finally, the comparison by Sims (2000) of the Commonwealth with the 
International Court of Justice for the purpose of solving disputes is pertinent. With 
disaster-related activities increasingly becoming a human rights concern (e.g. Kent, 
2001; Radix Network, at www.radixonline.org), could a Commonwealth SNIJ 
request adjudication on its governing state's allegedly inadequate disaster-related 
actions? Could the Commonwealth be asked to judge, or would it be ignored and 
bypassed, with these concerns taken elsewhere? Should the Commonwealth, as a 
global organization, promote itself as a first or last resort for such disputes? Some 
precautionary preparation and planning appear timely. 
Note 
1. As of March 2006 the Cayman Islands' report was from November 2005 and comprises 19 
tables for action, of which 16 tables were blank. BVI's report (undated) was two pages long, 
listing disaster-related project titles, timeframes and contact points. 
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Appendix 6.1 
Disaster-related Activities in the Constitutions of Commonwealth States 
with SNIJs 
The UK and its SNIJs Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man do not have written constitutions. 
Constitutional matters are interpreted based on common law and constitutionally related legal documents 
such as the Magna Carta. The UK's island overseas territories have constitutions, the disaster-related 
activities of which are mentioned in the paper's text. 
Constitutions with minimal mention of disaster-related activities: 
• India's constitution's Article 83 permits the sitting of parliament to be extended beyond five years if a 
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation. 
• New Zealand's constitution does not mention disaster-related activities, nor do the Cook Islands' and 
Niue's constitutions. Paragraph 6(5)(iv) of Tokelau's constitution states that, when the general 
parliament is not in session, a council will be formed to run government, of which one duty is to 
"respond to national emergencies". 
• Tanzania's constitution's First Schedule notes that 'emergency powers' are a Union Matter, i.e. for the 
state, not for any sub-national jurisdictions, including Zanzibar. 
• Tonga's constitution's paragraph 19(a)(ii) permits government expenditure without the prior vote of the 
Legislative Assembly "In cases of war or rebellion or dangerous epidemic or a similar emergency", 
although the Legislative Assembly must be informed immediately. 
Constitutions which detail powers to declare, and act during, a state of emergency with no further 
discussion of disaster-related activities: 
• Antigua and Barbuda • Mozambique 
• Bahamas • St Kitts and Nevis 
• Fiji • St Vincent and the Grenadines 
• Kiribati • Samoa 
• Malaysia • Seychelles 
• Malta • Solomon Islands 
• Maldives • Trinidad and Tobago 
• Mauritius • Vanuatu 
Constitutions which detail powers to declare, and act during, a state of emergency with further mention of 
disaster-related activities: 
• Papua New Guinea's constitution's Paragraph 202 states "The functions of the Defence Force are ... (c) 
to provide assistance to civilian authorities - (i) in a civil disaster; or (ii) in the restoration of public order 
and security on being called out in accordance with Section 204 (call-out in aid to the civil power)". 
• South Africa's constitution's Schedule 4 states that "functional areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence' include 'disaster management", but none of the provinces are SNIJs. 
• Tuvalu's constitution includes a subsidiary section in which the prime minister is assigned responsibility 
for disaster preparedness. 
